Entries Tagged 'Federal Reserve' ↓
December 9th, 2011 — MSM Newsletter
Say you were playing poker.
I don’t mean gambling, but real cards. You’re engaged with some seriousness. You’re watching how you bet and when, reading the players ahead and after you.
Then The House starts doling out stacks of chips. Would you play more or less cautiously if you had free chips?
Apply this thinking to equity markets, IR folks. In trading data, we saw European money sweeping into US equities Nov 28. Why did markets trembling Nov 25 decide by the following Monday to up the ante in risk-taking? Primary dealers implementing policy for global central banks also drive most program-trading strategies.
Thus, European money surmised that central banks would intervene, and their behavior reflected it. The rest caught on, and markets soared Nov 30 on free chips from central banks. It was short-lived. By Dec 2, we saw institutions market-wide assaying portfolio risk and locking in higher derivatives insurance. The chips were gone.
Money sat back expectantly. On Dec 8, The House delivered chips as the European Central Bank lowered interest rates. That’s devaluing the euro. At first, cheapening the euro increases the value of the dollar – which lowers US stocks (a la Dec 8). But if you’d hedged with derivatives as most of the globe did, you bluffed The House. Plus, the Fed will likely have to follow Europe’s bet up with a see-and-raise to devalue the dollar back into line with the euro (expect it next week, but before options expirations).
In poker, having “the nuts” is holding the best cards, and knowing it. Central banks have given arbitragers the nuts. Continue reading →
October 4th, 2011 — MSM Newsletter
In politics, Bill Clinton perfected the “trial balloon.” You float an idea of one shade because you’re planning on getting people to embrace an idea of another larger construct.
In fiction writing, authors will create portent by ending a chapter with something like: “She could never have imagined the consequences of her decision.” You can’t wait to turn the page to find out what she couldn’t imagine. The writer has subtly influenced your behavior.
The Fed is always trying to influence our behavior. Market performance October 4 (today) was mostly about Fed influence. Affirming commitment as lender of last resort – which sounds good but means “we will print endless piles of cash” – is the same as devaluing the dollar. So the dollar plunged in the last hour of trading, and stocks soared. (We all want stocks to rise but think about a teeter-totter. That’s stocks and dollars.)
In trading markets, exchanges continuously toy with behaviors by changing the spreads between fees for taking shares away and credits for bringing them to sell (this is the root cause of high-frequency trading). Exchanges are influencing behaviors.
Why does it matter? IR is about influencing behavior. In the past, we did it mostly with operating results, investment thesis and investor-targeting. Today, it must go further. Do you consider the impact of Fed policy and adapt your institutional outreach to match your investment thesis to impending changes in behavior? You should. If programs stall, don’t keep talking to growth money; shift to high-turn, deep-value money. Continue reading →
August 9th, 2011 — MSM Newsletter
Headline at 2:34 p.m. Eastern Time today: “Fed Pledges Low Rates Through 2013.”
How many recognize this as a currency-devaluation? Markets jumped 4% here in the U.S. as the DXY, the dollar index, dropped.
Last Sunday, the European Central Bank pledged to monetize debts of Italy and Spain. Monday, markets plunged globally. That’s a currency-devaluation. The central bank is promising to increase the supply of currency without a corresponding increase in economic output.
Most blamed S&P’s downgrade of US debt. But the dollar strengthened, and Treasurys increased in value. Why would the diminished instruments be more valuable?
Because that’s not what caused markets to tank. Continue reading →
July 19th, 2011 — MSM Newsletter
Would you rather ride your road bike in the sun or the rain?
What if riding in the sun means peddling across Death Valley in the summer, while the rain is a passing shower in the Italian Dolomites?
Context is essential. Let’s apply the same thinking to decisions about stock-repurchases and dividends. Conventional wisdom has long held that both actions appeal to the kinds of stock buyers who hold securities and count on fundamentals.
No argument there. But ponder the third dimension in the IR chair. The first dimension is your story – what defines and differentiates your investment thesis. The second is targeting the kind of money that likes your story. The third dimension is the state of your equity store.
Your equity is a product, competing with other products, with unique supply and demand constraints. If you suppose that your story is correct for a particular buyer without considering whether the buyer can act on interest in your story, you’re leaving money on the table. So to speak.
For instance, if I want four Keith Urban tickets at Pepsi Center in October for no more than $50 each, I’m already sold on the investment thesis – “Keith Urban puts on a good show.” What if there are only two tickets available at $50? Well, I’m not the right buyer for the investment thesis, then. Continue reading →
June 7th, 2011 — MSM Newsletter
Coming to NIRI National 2011 next week? Please visit us at Booth 304! We have no helicopter rides or trips to the Bahamas to give, but we do have a really cool microfiber for keeping those ubiquitous touchscreen pads and smartphones sharp.
June launched by kicking markets right in the rump. We blamed economic data. It’s true but not that simple. Behind the data at the behavioral level, institutions decided against equities roughly May 13. We don’t make this up, we just observe it in the way trades execute. When methodologies, purposes or time horizons change, it manifests in trade executions.
Money didn’t hedge with options expirations May 18-20 either. If you decide not to insure your house against loss, what might that mean? That you expect to sell it shortly, that risk is nonexistent, or that insurance is too darned expensive. As an analogy, two of those three are negatives and the middle one doesn’t exist on Wall Street.
Continue reading →